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Subgame-perfect  equilibria  are  characterized  for  a  market  in  which  the  seller 
quotes  a  price  each  period.  Assume  zero  costs,  positive  interest  rate,  continuum  of 
buyers,  and  some  technical  conditions.  If  buyers’  valuations  are  positive  then 
equilibrium  is  unique,  buyers’  strategies  are  stationary,  and  the  price  sequence  is 
determinant  along  the  equilibrium  path  but  possibly  randomized  elsewhere, 
Otherwise  a  continuum  of  stationary  equilibria  can  exist,  but  at  most  one  with 
analytic  strategies.  Coase’s  conjecture  is  verified  for  stationary  strategies:  reducing 
the  period  length  drives  all  prices  to  zero  or  the  least  valuation.  Connections  to 
bargaining  models  are  described.  Journal  qf  Economic  Literature  Classification 
Number:  022.  c  1986  Academic  Press,  Inc. 
INTRODUCTION 
A  dynamic  theory  of  monopoly  must  take  into  account  the  fact  that  a 
monopolist  cannot  normally  sign  contracts  to  guarantee  that  the  future 
prices  of his  output  will  be  above  some  minimal  level.  Thus,  in  a  dynamic 
theory  the  time  path  of prices  will  generally  not  be the  one  which,  if a corn-. 
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mitment  to  future  prices  were  possible,  would  bring  forth  demands  that 
maximize  the  discounted  stream  of revenues  minus  costs. Let  pi,  p;,...  be a 
maximizing  price  plan  if  commitment  is  possible.  Without  commitment, 
after  the  first  price  in  such  a  plan,  it  will  almost  never  be  in  the 
monopolist’s  interest  to  announce  p;.  But  consumers  know  this,  and  so we 
can  expect  that  they  will  not  anticipate  the  later  prices  in  the  plan  when  the 
first  price  is  announced,  Thus,  even  if  consumers  individually  have  no 
market  power,  they  will  not  purchase  in  the  first  period  as if the  subsequent 
prices  p;,  p;  ,... where  given.  As a consequence,  in  a dynamic  theory  it  is not 
in  the  monopolist’s  interest  to  announce  p;  in  the  first  period.  In  order  for  a 
plan  to  be  dynamically  consistent  it  must  be  the  case that: 
(a)  Consumers  correctly  anticipate  prices,  and 
(b)  At  every point  in  time  the  monopolist  can  not  increase  the  expec- 
ted  present  value  of his  remaining  profit  by  deviating  from  the  price  path 
that  is expected  by  consumers. 
In  other  words,  a  dynamic  theory  of monopoly  is  an  equilibrium  theory, 
and  it  seems natural  that  an equilibrium  perspective  is necessary for  analyz- 
ing  the  problem. 
To  clarify  further  the  necessity  for  an  equilibrium  perspective,  consider 
the  determination  of  the  first  price  in  a  market  in  which  the  monopolist 
announces  prices  in  quick  succession:  think  of a supplier  of mineral  water 
standing  at  his  source;  assume  that  he  is able  to  pump  at  any  rate  at  zero 
cost  and  to  change  his  price  at  will.’  Assume  also  that  there  are  consumers 
with  every  valuation  less than  some  arbitrary  positive  value.  On  the  one 
hand,  one  might  argue  that  the  monopolist  will  be able  to  discriminate  per- 
fectly,  since  the  time  he  needs to  make  his  way down  the  demand  curve  will 
be very  short.  On  the  other  hand,  one  might  argue  to  the  contrary  that  the 
monopolist  will  make  negligible  rents:  each  consumer  knows  that  the 
monopolist  intends  to  sell  eventually  to  the  lowest-valuation  consumer, 
and  since  the  time  between  offers  is  short,  he  believes  that  the  amount  of 
time  until  the  minimal  valuation  is reached  is  also  short,  and  thus  he  will 
not  buy  until  the  price  is  close  to  that  minimal  valuation.  The  interplay  of 
these  factors  is  the  main  theme  in  the  recent  literature  on  durable  goods 
monopoly  of  Bulow  [l],  Kahn  [7],  and  Stokey  [ll].  A  major  result  of 
this  paper  is to  affirm  a conjecture  of Coase  [2]  that  states  that  the  market 
will  open  at  a  price  close  to  zero.  In  summary,  without  repeat  purchases 
monopoly  rents  must  depend  substantially  on  a  monopolist’s  ability  to 
commit  to  prices  or  quantities  offered  in  the  future. 
A  second  purpose  of  the  paper  is  to  extend  Rubinstein’s  analysis  of the 
1 The  spirit  of  the  model  is  best  captured  by  assuming  that  the  water  is  medicinal,  and  that 
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bilateral  monopoly  bargaining  problem  with  alternating  offers  to  the  case 
that  a  seller  makes  repeated  offers  to  many  consumers.  The  striking  eon- 
elusion  of  Rubinstein’s  analysis  is  that  with  discounting  the  bilateral 
monopoly  has  a  unique  subgame-perfect  equilibrium  in  pure  strategies, 
even  when  there  is no  a priori  restriction  on  how long  the  bargaining  might 
continue.  In  fact,  Rubinstein  shows that  a bargain  is  reached  immediately, 
with  the  division  of the  gains  from  trade  uniquely  determined  by  the  par- 
ties’  rates  of  discount.  That  is,  discounting  is  sufficient  to  render  the 
bargaining  problem  determinate. 
In  contrast,  we  show  that  the  situation  in  which  a  monopolist  makes 
repeated  offers  to  a  continuum  of  consumers  is  considerably  more  com- 
plicated.  If  the  minimum  valuation  of  the  consumers  exceeds  the 
monopolist’s  (constant)  unit  cost,  as  in  Rubinstein’s  formulation,  then 
again  there  is generically  a  unique  subgame-perfect  equilibrium  determined 
by  the  distribution  of the  consumers’  valuations,  the  unit  cost,  and  the  dis- 
count  factor.’  This  equilibrium  predicts  a  decreasing  sequence  of  prices 
with  sales made  in  every  period  until  the  market  is  exhausted  after  a  finite 
number  of  periods  at  a  final  price  equal  to  the  least  valuation.  Off  the 
equilibrium  path,  however,  the  monopolist  may  employ  a  randomized 
strategy.  In  the  alternative  case  that  the  minimum  valuation  does  not 
exceed  the  unit  cost,  the  market  remains  open  forever,  and  there  may  be 
many  distinct  equilibria.  The  simple  case  of  a  uniform  distribution  of 
valuations  (i.e.,  a  linear  demand  function)  produces  both  one  equilibrium 
that  involves  no  randomization  off the  equilibrium  path,  and  a continuum 
of equilibria  requiring  such randomization-and  all  of these equilibria  have 
different  price  paths  and  profits  for  the  monopolist.  A substantial  regularity 
assumption,  requiring  a  smooth  variation  of  the  consumers’  strategies  as 
their  valuations  vary,  is  shown  to  restore  the  generic  uniqueness  of  the 
equilibrium.  Absent  some  such  assumption,  nevertheless,  we conclude  that 
in  monopolized  markets  discounting  is insufficient  in  itself  to  determine  the 
division  of the  gains  from  trade.  The  same  lack  of uniqueness  occurs  if the 
seller  makes  repeated  offers  to  a  single  buyer  with  private  information 
about  his  valuation.3  This  suggests  a  qualitative  discontinuity  in  the 
equilibria  of bargaining  problems  formulated  a la  Rubinstein. 
The  paper  is  organized  as follows:  In  Section  1 we define  the  preferences 
and  strategies  of the  players  and  explain  the  notion  of equilibrium.  In  Sec- 
tion  2  we  consider  a  particular  example  of  a  market  with  zero  costs  of 
production,  and  describe  its  unique  equilibrium.  The  equilibrium  exhibits 
properties  that  are  important  in  the  analysis.  First,  it  requires  no  raa- 
domization  along  the  equilibrium  path:  prices  are  determinant  and 
2 We  assume  that  the  monopolist  and  the  consumers  all  have  the  same  discount  factor 
3 Assume  that  the  seller’s  cost  is  interior  to  the  support  of  the  buyer’s  valuation. 
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decrease  over  time.  Second,  randomization  is  required  off the  equilibrium 
path.  Third,  the  strategies  of  consumers  satisfy  a  stationarity  property; 
namely,  the  distribution  of  consumers  left  in  the  market  after  any  price 
(that  is  lower  than  all  preceding  prices)  is  independent  of  the  prior  price 
history  in  the  market.  Section  3  states  the  main  existence  and  uniqueness 
results  for  the  case that  the  minimum  valuation  among  the  consumers  is 
greater  than  the  unit  cost  of production,  and  Section  4  presents  the  theory 
for  the  case that  this  hypothesis  does  not  hold.  Section  5  states  the  Coase 
conjecture  for  arbitrary  market  demand.  Section  6 is composed  of a variety 
of  notes,  several  of  which  relate  our  results  to  existing  literature.  Among 
these  is  the  observation  that  our  notion  of  equilibrium  provides  foun- 
dations  for  the  equilibrium  concept  used  in  the  theory  of  durable  goods 
monopoly  and  that  all  our  theorems  apply  to  that  theory.  Also,  we observe 
that  our  existence  and  uniqueness  theorems  both  generalize  and  strengthen 
the  work  of  Sobel  and  Takahashi  [lo],  Cramton  [3],  and  Fudenberg, 
Levine,  and  Tirole  [4]  on  equilibrium  for  bargaining  models  in  which  a 
seller  with  known  valuation  makes  price  offers to  a single  consumer  whose 
valuation  is  a  random  variable  (the  value  of  which  is  known  only  to  the 
consumer);  such  bargaining  models  have  a  formal  equivalence  to  the 
models  studied  here.  The  proofs  are  presented  in  an  Appendix. 
1.  SPECIFICATION  OF  THE  MODEL 
The  monopolist  faces  a  unit  (Lebesgue)  measure  of  non-atomic  con- 
sumers  indexed  by  4 E [0,  11.  Each  consumer  is  in  the  market  to  buy  one 
unit  of  the  monopolist’s  product,  and  can  buy  that  unit  at  any  time 
i=o,  1, 2 )... . The  preferences  of consumers  are  defined  by  specifying  a non- 
increasing  left-continuous  function  f:  [0,  1 ]  -+  ‘!I?  +  and  a discount  factor  6. 
Specifically,  if  consumer  q E [0,  1 ]  buys  the  product  at  time  i  at  price  p, 
then  his  utility  is  [f(q)  -  p]  S’.4  Assume  without  loss  of  generality  that 
f(q)  is positive  for  all  q <  1. At  various  times,  the  following  two  conditions 
are  imposed: 
(B)  f(  1) is  positive. 
(L)  f  satisfies  a  Lipschitz  condition  at  1. 
The  discount  factor  6  is positive  and  less than  one;  all  of the  consumers 
and  the  monopolist  have  the  same  discount  factor.5  The  monopolist’s  unit 
costs  are  constant  and  zero.6  Each  consumer  maximizes  his  expected 
4 See  6.7  in  Section  6  for  the  interpretation  of  the  utility  function. 
5 Only  the  coincidence  of  the  consumers’  discount  factors  is  necessary  for  the  analysis. 
6 To  see  that  the  analysis  with  zero  costs  captures  the  case  of  a  general  constant  cost  c,  rein- 
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utility,  and  the  monopolist  maximizes  the  expected  present  value  of  his 
revenue  stream.7 
In  each  period,  first  the  monopolist  specifies  a price  and  then  those  con- 
sumers  who  have  not  previously  purchased  simultaneously  choose  whether 
to  accept  or  to  reject  this  price.  A  consumer  who  rejects  continues  as an 
active  player  until  he  eventually  accepts  some  price;  his  utility  is zero  if he 
never  accepts  an  offered  price.  At  any  time  all  players  have  perfect  recall  of 
the  previous  history  of the  game. 
A strategy  for  the  monopolist  specifies  at  each  time  a price  to  charge  as a 
function  of the  history  of the  game.*  A  strategy  for  a  consumer  specifies  at 
each  time  and  after  each  history  in  which  he  has  not  previously  purchased 
whether  to  accept  or  to  reject  the  monopolist’s  offered  In-ice;  equivalently, 
it  specifies  the  set  of prices  the  consumer  will  accept.  We  seek  a  subgame- 
perfect  Nash  equilibrium  of this  game. 
There  are  some  subtle  issues involved  in  defining  the  game  that  naturally 
arise  from  the  above  description;  for  example,  technical  restrictions  are 
necessary  to  insure  that  at  each  stage  the  set  of consumers  accepting  an 
offer  is measurable  so  that  the  monopolist’s  revenue  can  be  evaluated. 
also  argue  that  in  order  to  characterize  the  subgame-perfect  equilibrium 
paths  of  a  sensible  version  of  the  above  game,  it  is  sufficient  to  consider 
strategies  depending  only  on  the  past  history  of prices. 
First,  we  observe  that  in  this  extensive-form  game,  if  the  players’ 
strategies  prescribe  behavior  that  is  optimal  for  each  player  for  all  histories 
that  result  from  no  simultaneous  deviations,  then  the  equilibrium  path 
prescribed  is the  equilibrium  path  of a subgame-perfect  equilibrium.  To  see 
this  replace  that  portion  of  the  strategies  in  any  subgame  that  follows 
simultaneous  deviations  by  equilibrium  behavior  in  the  subgame:  this  does 
not  change  the  equilibrium  path.  Next  we  assume  that  the  equilibrium 
actions  of each  agent  are  constant  on  histories  in  which  prices  are  the  same 
and  the  sets of agents  accepting  at  each  point  in  time  differ  at  most  by  sets 
of  measure  zero.  To  some  extent  this  represents  a  natural  regularity 
requirement;  however,  the  assumption  has  substantial  force  and  it  affects 
the  set of equilibria.  It  is a maintained  hypothesis  in  the  analysis.’  With  this 
assumption,  unilateral  deviations  by  non-atomic  consumers  can  change 
neither  the  actions  of  the  remaining  consumers  nor  the  actions  of  the 
monopolist.  Thus,  only  unilateral  deviations  of  the  monopolist  can  affect 
the  course  of the  game.  From  the  observation  that  simultaneous  deviations 
‘If  mi  is  the  measure  of  the  consumers  purchasing  in  response  to  the  price  pi  in  period  i 
then  the  monopolist’s  present  value  is  Cr  pimi 6’.  We  adopt  the  convention  that  the  initial 
period  is  i =  0. 
’  We  shall  show  that  the  game  in  which  the  monopolist  chooses  quantities  is  a  special  case 
allowing  somewhat  simpler  specification  of  the  off-the-equilibrium-path  strategies. 
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from  the  equilibrium  path  are  unimportant  in  checking  for  subgame  perfec- 
tion,  it  follows  that  in  order  to  show that  a  path  is  associated  with  a  sub- 
game-perfect  equilibrium  it  is  necessary  and  sufficient  to  specify  actions  for 
each  agent  as functions  of the  monopolist’s  previous  plays  (that  is,  price 
histories),  so that  (a)  these  functions  generate  the  given  path,  and  (b)  after 
each  price  history  the  prescribed  actions  are  optimal. 
2.  A  SIMPLE  EXAMPLE 
In  this  example  only,  the  consumers  are  uniformly  distributed  on  the 
interval  [0,  21  with  total  measure  2. The  monopolist  initially  holds  at  least 
measure  2 of the  commodity  or  can  produce  at  zero  cost.  Those  consumers 
qe  [IO, l]  have  the  valuation  3  and  those  in  (1,2]  have  the  valuation  1. 
The  discount  factor  is  6 =  l/2. 
There  is  a  unique  “perfect  foresight”  equilibrium,  as  considered  by 
Bulow  [ 11,  Stokey  [ 111,  and  Kahn  [7]  for  this  example.  It  is given  by  the 
price  sequence  p0 =  2,  p1 =  1,  and  the  sale  quantities  m,  =  m,  =  1.  These 
prices  and  quantities  also  occur  along  the  equilibrium  path  in  the  subgame- 
perfect  equilibrium.  However,  there  is  no pure  strategy  equilibrium  for  the 
game  as specified  with  the  monopolist  offering  prices. 
To  see this,  first  observe  that  in  any  equilibrium  the  prices  must  be 2 and 
1 in  the  last  two  periods  before  sales cease. If  sufficiently  few high-valuation 
consumers  remain  (less  than  half  as  we  shall  see  below),  then  the 
monopolist  prefers  to  offer  the  price  1 and  clear  the  market,  so  the  final 
price  is  1. If  the  initial  price  is  1 or  the  penultimate  price  exceeds 2, then  all 
the  high-valuation  consumers  will  buy  at  the  final  price  of 1 (they  prefer  a 
price  of 1 tomorrow  to  any  price  exceeding  2 today);  this  is not  optimal  for 
the  monopolist  since  he  can  make  some  sales  at  a  penultimate  price  not 
exceeding  2 and  do  better  (as we shall  see in  more  detail  below).  This  price 
can  not  be  less  than  2,  however,  since  if  it  were  then  all  of  the  high- 
valuation  consumers  would  buy  (they  prefer  any  price  less than  2 to  a price 
of  1 later)  and  therefore  the  monopolist  prefers  to  increase  any  price  less 
than  2: no  price  between  1 and  2 can  be  optimal  for  the  monopolist.  Thus, 
the  final  prices  are  2 and  then  1. These  can  not  be the  prices  in  a subgame- 
perfect  pure-strategy  equilibrium,  however.  If  the  monopolist  deviates  from 
the  prescribed  price  of 2  and  offers a  slightly  higher  price,  then  either  all, 
some,  or  none  of  the  high-valuation  consumers  will  purchase.  If  all,  then 
the  next  price  is  expected  to  be  1,  so  their  behavior  is  not  optimal.‘O  If 
some,  then  the  next  price  is  expected  to  be  between  1  and  2,  so  that  the 
lo We  ignore  here  the  possibility  that  a  single  consumer’s  choice  of whether  or  not  to  buy 
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high-valuation  consumers  are  indifferent  about  purchasing  now rather  than 
waiting;  but  we  have  seen  that  such  a  price  is  never  optimal  for  the 
monopolist.  If  none,  then  the  next  price  is expected  to  be  2, in  which  case 
they  should  accept  the  slightly  higher  price  offered  now.  Thus,  there  can 
not  be  a subgame-perfect  equilibrium  in  pure  strategies. 
A  subgame-perfect  equilibrium  for  this  example  requires  that  the 
monopolist  employs  a  mixed  strategy  off the  equilibrium  path.  Half  of the 
high-valuation  consumers  purchase  if the  price  offered  does  not  exceed  2;: 
and  the  other  half  buy  when  it  does  not  exceed  2;  the  low-valuation  con- 
sumers  buy  when  the  price  does  not  exceed  1. If  the  monopolist  charges 
any  price  exceeding  24, then  none  of the  consumers  accept:  they  expect  him 
to  charge  2 next  period.  If  he  charges  any  prices  in  (2,241,  then  half  of the 
high-valuation  consumers  accept:  they  are  indifferent  about  accepting  since 
they  expect  that  next  period  he  will  randomize  between  the  prices  2  and  1 
(with  probab’l’t’  11 ies  that  substantiate  their  indifference).  If  he  charges  any 
price  not  exceeding  2,  then  all  the  high-valuation  consumers  accept.  The 
monopolist’s  strategy  is  to  charge  2 if  at  least  half  the  high-valuation  con- 
sumers  remain,  and  1 otherwise-unless  he previously  deviated  by  charging 
a price  in  (2,2&),  in  which  case he  randomizes  between  2  and  I  if precisely 
half  of the  high-valuation  consumers  remain.  Note  that  the  randomization 
following  a  deviation  is  optimal  for  the  monopolist  since  with  half  of the 
high-valuation  consumers  remaining  he  is  indifferent  whether  to  charge  2 
now (and  1 next  period),  or  to  clear  the  market  by  charging  I:  both  yield  a 
present  value  of  1;. 
In  this  example  there  is  no  randomization  on  the  equilibrium  path,  the 
strategies  of  consumers  are  stationary,  the  equilibrium  specifies  a  deter- 
minant  decreasing  sequence  of prices,  and  the  market  closes  after  a  finite 
number  of  periods.  Theorem  1  and  its  corollary  show that  we have  iden- 
tified  the  unique  equilibrium  for  this  example,  and  that  the  form  of  the 
equilibrium  is general  for  markets  in  which  the  minimum  of the  consumers’ 
valuations  exceeds  the  constant  unit  cost  of production. 
3.  MARKETS  WITH  CONSUMERS  VALUATKIN~ 
BOUNDED  AWAY  FROM  ZERQ 
THEOREM 1.  rf  f  satisfies  (B)  and  (I,)  then  there  exist  A  c  [O,  l], 
t:  [O, I]  +  [O,  11,  and  P:  [0,  l]  +‘Ji++  such  that  (qz, pi]~~0  ix  a;~ 
equilibrium  path  if  and  only  if  q0 = 0,  q1 E A,  (Vi>  I)  qi+,  = t(q,),  md 
(Vi&O)  pi=  P(q,+l).l’ 
‘I  Fudenberg,  Levine,  and  Tirole  prove  a  related  result  in  the  context  of  a  bargaining  model 
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Explanation: 
l  q1 is the  initial  quantity  sold  in  response  to  the  monopolist’s  initial 
offer pO . 
l  t  determines  subsequent  quantities  sold  along  the  equilibrium  path, 
in  terms  of the  market  penetration  achieved. 
l  P  defines  equilibrium  prices  as  a  function  of  the  market 
penetration  achieved. 
Let  C(f,  6)  denote  the  set  of  equilibria  for  the  market  (f,  6)  and  let 
P(f,  6)  denote  the  subset  of equilibria  which  satisfy  the  condition  that  the 
state  of the  market,  after  any  price  that  is lower  than  all  preceding  prices,  is 
independent  of the  earlier  price  history  in  the  market.  Equilibria  in  C”(f,  6) 
are said  to  be  stationary  for  the  consumers,  since the  sets of those  accepting 
and  those  rejecting  depend  only  on  the  current  price.  The  following  is  an 
immediate  consequence  of Theorem  1. 
COROLLARY.  Generic  markets  satisfying  (B)  and  (L)  have  a  unique 
equilibrium  path  and  this path  leads  to  a determinate  sequence of price  offers 
and  acceptances.  Furthermore,  the path  is associated  with  an equilibrium  that 
is stationary  for  the  consumers,  prices  are  decreasing  along  the  equilibrium 
path,  and  all  consumers  are  served  after  a finite  number  of  offers.” 
4.  MARKETS WITH  VALUATIONS  ARBITRARILY  CLOSE  TO  ZERO 
Theorem  1  and  its  corollary  are  concerned  with  markets  in  which  the 
valuations  of consumers  are  bounded  aways from  zero;  that  is, assumption 
(B)  is  satisfied.  For  such  markets  we  establish  that  all  equilibria  are 
associated  with  stationary  strategies  on  the  part  of the  consumers;  that  is, 
P(J  6) =  A’(f,  6).  Furthermore,  we  prove  that  an  equilibrium  generically 
defines  a  unique  decreasing  sequence  of price  offers  and  acceptances.  For 
markets  in  which  the  valuations  of consumers  are  not  bounded  away  from 
zero,  the theory  is not  nearly  so orderly.  Before  entering  into  a discussion 
of  these  markets,  we  would  like  to  make  clear  why  they  represent  the 
relevant  case. 
dom  variable.  We  learned  a  great  deal  from  their  analysis;  in  particular,  our  proof  of 
Theorem  1 makes  substantial  use  of their  ideas. Our  hypotheses  are  weaker  since  we  do  not 
assume  that  f  is differentiable  with  differentiable  inverse.  Also,  our  conclusion  substantially 
strengthens  the  characterization  of equilibrium  prices.  See note  6.2  in  Section  6. 
r2 All  equilibria  are  equivalent  in  the  sense that  they specify (a)  the  same equilibrium  path, 
(b)  the  same  strategy for  the  monopolist,  and  (c)  up  to  closure,  the  same  acceptance  sets for 
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So far  discussion  has ignored  costs of production.  This  was done  because 
we have  in  mind  stationary  constant  unit  costs,  and  as we have  mentione 
(see footnote  6)  such  costs  can  be  subsumed  into  the  definition  of demand 
(replace  f  by f  -  c).  With  this  formulation  prices  are  interpreted  as net  of 
unit  cost,  and  the  net  valuation  of consumers  can  be  negative.  Indeed,  in  a 
monopolized  market,  without  the  possibility  for  commitment  past  the 
current  period,  the  commodity  will  eventially  be sold  to  all  consumers  with 
a  net  positive  valuation.  The  case  in  which  f(1)  >  0  corresponds  to  a 
situation  in  which  there  is  no  “marginal”  consumer.  When  f(i)  <  0,  the 
market  remains  open  for  an  infinite  number  of periods,  and  the  marginal 
consumer  is  identified.  Since  consumers  with  negative  net  valuations  are 
never  served,  one  can  consider,  without  loss of generality,  the  case f(  1) =  0. 
Even  when  one  confines  attention  to  equilibria  in  cS(,f,  6),  without  the 
assumption  (B)  that  f(1)  >  0  it  is  not  the  case  that  there  is  a  unique 
equilibrium.  In  fact,  even  for  the  case  of  linear  demand  there  is  a  con- 
tinuum  of  disjoint  equilibrium  paths.  In  Examples  1  and  2  two  distinct 
equilibria  are  exhibited.  In  Example  3  it  is  shown  how  Example  2  can  be 
altered  to  produce  a  continuum  of equilibria. 
EXAMPLE  1.  We  consider  the  example  with  a  linear  demand  function 
f(q)  =  1 -  4.  Stokey  [ll]  studies  this  example  in  a Cournot  formulation  ; 
which  the  monopolist  offers  quantities  rather  than  prices.  In  t 
equilibrium  she derives,  in  period  i after  any  history  that  results  in  sales to 
the  qi  consumers  with  valuations  exceeding  1 -  qi,  the  monopolist  offers a 
quantity  R[ 1 -  qi]  that  receives  the  price  pi  =  /?[ 1 -  qi],  where  c( and  /Y arc 
two  parameters  to  be  determined.  One  can  determine  c( and  p  from  sym- 
metry  conditions,  since  along  the  equilibrium  path  successive markets  are 
related  to  each  other  by  a  scaling  transformation.  Thus,  if  the  price  is 
pi=  p(qi)  when  qi consumers  have  been  served  then  p(q)  =  [I  -q]  p(O)  and 
the  monopolist’s  present  value  of remaining  profits  is R(q)  =  4[ 1 -  q]’  p(O). 
where  the  initial  price  is p(O) =  fi and  the  initial  quantity  is  CL  Optimality  of 
the  monopolist’s  strategy  requires  that  4 =  t(q)  E  q +  a[  1 -  q]  is  the  choice 
that  achieves  the  maximum  in  the  monopolist’s  associated  dynamic 
programming  problem 
R(q) = max f(q)Cq -  ql + Wh  Yaq 
where  P(q)  is  the  highest  price  that  will  induce  all  consumers  with 
valuations  exceedingf(q)  to  accept.  Utility  maximization  by  the  consumers 
implies  that 
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so  that  consumer  4  is  indifferent  between  accepting  or  waiting  another 
period.  By  hypothesis, 
t(4)  =  q +  a[  1 -  41, 
P(t(a)  = P(4) = PC1  -  41; 
hence, 
-YCl-41, 
where  y =  1 -8  +  S/I.  The  unique  values  that  satisfy  these  relationships  are 
cx=/3=6/(1  +S), 
where  SE  J1-s.  One  can  further  verify  using  the  methods  developed 
later  that  with  these  values  a  subgame-perfect  equilibrium  is  in  fact 
obtained.  The  Coase  conjecture  is verified  in  this  example  by  noting  that  as 
6 +  1  the  initial  price  p(O)  =p  --f 0,  the  initial  quantity  cx  -+  0,  and  the 
monopolist’s  present  value  R(0)  +  0.  Also,  if one  interprets  the  increase  in 
the  discount  factor  as due  to  a shortening  of the  duration  of a  period,  say 
6 G e--rd  and  d  +  0,  then  the  limiting  value  of each  consumer’s  expected 
utility  is  his  valuation;  that  is,  trades  occur  early. 
EXAMPLE  2.  In  this  example  we  assume  the  same  linear  demand 
functionf(q)  =  1 -  q as in  Example  1, but  we require  that  the  discount  fac- 
tor  is  sufficiently  large.  We  construct  an  equilibrium  with  strikingly  dif- 
ferent  properties,  although  the  equilibrium  path  has  a  superficial  resem- 
blance  to  the  equilibrium  path  of  Example  1  and  it  enjoys  the  same 
asymptotic  properties  as 6 +  1. In  each  period  i  after  serving  qi consumers 
the  monopolist  charges  the  price  pi=  a[1  -  qi]  and  sells  the  quantity 
a[  1 -  qi];  thus,  p =  pO/[l  -  qo]  and  CI  =  [ql  -  qo]/[  1 -so],  or  starting 
from  qo=  0  the  initial  price  is  p,, =  p  and  the  initial  quantity  is  q1 =  a. 
Similarly, 
t(qi)=4i+“C1  -SilP 
pi=  Cl --aliP,, 
along  the  equilibrium  path,  precisely  as  along  the  equilibrium  path  of 
Example  1.  The  resemblance  ends  here,  however,  since  the  equilibrium 
values  of CI and  /3 are  different,  and  the  strategies  off the  equilibrium  path 
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The  key  to  the  construction  of this  equilibrium  is  the  specification  of the 
strategies  off the  equilibrium  path.  The  form  of the  equilibrium  strategies  is 
the  following:  In  any  period  (not  necessarily  period  i),  if those  consumers 
previously  served  are  those  with  valuations  exceeding  1 -  9  and 
4 E (qj-  r,  q,),  then  the  monopolist  charges  Pi.  Me  does  the  same  if  q =  q, 
unless  in  the  previous  period  he deviated  and  charged  a price  P  E (Pi,  Pi-  i ), 
where  Pi-  I  =  [ 1 -S]  [ 1 -  qi-  i]  +  SP:,  in  which  case  he  randomizes 
between  the  prices  pi  and  pi+  1 with  probabilities  determined  so as to  make 
the  consumer  with  valuation  1 -  qi  indifferent  whether  to  accept  the  price  p 
in  the  previous  period  or  to  wait  for  the  subsequent  lottery  between  the 
next  two  prices.  The  consumers’  responses  have  essentially  the  simple  form 
derived  in  Example  1:  one  with  the  valuation  1 -  q  accepts  any  price 
P  d  P(q),  where  if  q  E (qjp  r,  qi]  then 
note,  however,  that  unlike  Example  1  in  this  case  the  consumers’  reser- 
vation  price  strategy  is  represented  by  the  piecewise-linear  left-continuous 
decreasing  function  P  with  downward  jumps  at  qi  of  magnitude 
6rP-P1.11. 
An  equilibrium  of this  form  entails  the  following  relationships:  First,  the 
present  value  of  the  monopolist’s  subsequent  revenues  after  serving  the  4 
consumers  with  valuations  exceeding  1 -  q  is  piecewise-linear  and  con- 
tinuous  of the  form  R(q)  =  Rj  +  pi[qi  -  q]  if  q E  (q,-  , , q,]  and  Ri  3  R(q,). 
In  addition, 
Pi=  Cl  -slC1-qi+ll  +6pj+lv 
Ri=  PiCqi+l-q4i]  +  dRi+l, 
R,=Ri+l+pi+lCq,+,-qil; 
which  express  respectively  the  consumers’  behavior,  the  recursion  for  the 
monopolist’s  present  value,  and  the  continuity  of the  monopolist’s  present 
value  function,  all  along  the  equilibrium  path.  An  immediate  consequence 
of (2)  and  (3)  is  that 
which  with  (2)  assures  that  the  monopolist  is  in  fact  willing  to  randomaze 
at  qi  between  the  prices  pi  and  pi+  1 when  required  after  a previous  deviant 
price  p  E (Pi,  pidl).  The  conditions  (l),  (2),  and  (3)  have  a  solution 166 
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cc-&i 
PO= Cl-f&l-  i-&i’  &  = PoCl -  4cll&~ 
and  a is  determined  as the  solution  in  (0,  1) of the  equationI 
One  can  show that  & +  1 as 6 -+  1; indeed,  as a function  of 6, cl is convex 
and  increasing  with  an  infinite  rate  of  increase  at  1.  In  terms  of  the 
specification  above, 
a=l-cr  and 
a-&i 
P=----,  1-G 
which  both  tend  to  0  as 6 +  1. 
The  verification  that  this  specification  yields  an  equilibrium  can  be 
accomplished  in  two  parts.  For  the  first  part  we can  apply  the  following 
lemma,  which  is  a  consequence  of repeated  applications  of  (2)  and  (3):  If 
jai+2  then  Ri>pj[qj+l-qj]+dRj+l.  Along  the  equilibrium  path  this 
assures that  the  monopolist  prefers  to  name  the  price  pi  at  qi rather  than 
any  price  pj <  pi+ 1  <pi.  For  the  second  part  we must  verify  that  at  any 
q E (qi-  i,  qi]  the  monopolist  prefers  the  price  pi to  any  other  p # pi (except 
pi+l  if  q =  qi).  We  omit  the  lengthy  derivation  of  this  result  except  to 
remark  that  the  proof  depends  on  the  assumption  that  a2 >  4,  which  is 
assured  if 6 >  2 -  4.  Thus  if  the  discount  factor  is  sufficiently  large  then 
the  specification  yields  an  equilibrium. 
EXAMPLE  3.  We  now  turn  to  the  demonstration  that  the  equilibrium 
derived  in  Example  2  can  be  generalized  to  generate  a  continuum  of 
equilibria.  The  key  observation  is to  note  that  in  the  construction  of Exam- 
ple  2  the  specification  of q.  is  a  free  parameter.  For  each  sufficiently  small 
negative  value  of q,, there  exists  an  additional  equilibrium  in  which  the  play 
of the  game  proceeds  as follows:  The  monopolist  begins  with  q =  0  which 
lies  in  one  of the  intervals  (qjP i,  qi]  generated  by  the  choice  of q,,. Inter- 
pret  this  situation  as the  initiation  of  a  subgame  imbedded  in  the  larger 
game  corresponding  to  the  choice  of q,,; that  is, imagine  that  the  measure  1 
of consumers  present  is  the  residual  after  a  portion  lqo/ of  a  larger  pop- 
ulation  of measure  1 -  q.  has  been  served.  Then,  the  equilibrium  prescribes 
that  the  monopolist  opens  with  the  initial  offer pj,  and  that  the  consumers 
I3 A  typical  example  with  q.  =  0  and  6  =  0,9  yields  z  =  0.8247,  p.  =  0.3199  and  R.  =  0.1446. DYNAMIC  MONOPOLY  167 
with  valuations  no  less  than  1 -  qj+  1 accept.  Similarly,  if  the  monopolist 
deviates  and  opens  with  any  offer p E (pi,  pip  1  ]  then  those  consumers  with 
valuations  no  less than  1 -  qj accept,  and  in  particular  if p E (pj,,  pj-  l)  then 
they  expect  that  next  time  he  will  randomize  between  the  prices  pj  an 
p,+  1.  And,  if  he  opens  with  a  price  exceeding  plP  1 then  no  consumers 
accept.  All  these  behaviors  are  simply  the  subgame-perfect  equilibrium 
strategies  in  the  subgame  of the  game  in  which  the  ‘real’  game  is interpreted 
as imbedded.  After  these opening  moves,  the  play  continues  precisely  in  the 
same  fashion,  using  the  critical  values  qk  and  pk  for  k  3 j  generated  from 
the  choice  of qo. 
From  this  construction,  therefore,  we see that  the  market  with  a linear 
demand  function  and  a discount  factor  sufficiently  large  has a contimmm  ef 
equilibria.  All  of  these  equilibria  have  entirely  disjoint  equilibrium  paths, 
though  they  share  many  features  in  common  such  as described  above:  in 
each  case  the  monopolist’s  prices  in  successive  periods  have  a  constanr 
ratio,  and  after  the  first  period  a constant  percentage  of the  unserved  con- 
sumers  accept  each  period  (these  constants  differ  between  Example  1 and 
Examples  2  and  3). 
The  possibility  of  a  continuum  of  equilibria  presents  serious  difficulties 
for  the  theory.  The  striking  feature  of  Rubinstein’s  [S]  seminal  paper  on 
the  bargaining  problem  is  that  it  demonstrates  that  even  with  an  infinite 
horizon,  impatience  is  sufficient  to  give  a  determinant  solution  to  the 
bargaining  problem.  Theorem  1 tells  us  that  this  conclusion  remains  true 
with  one-sided  offers  and  many  consumers  when  the  valuation  of  the 
monopolist  is not  a member  of the  set of valuations  of the  consumers.  The 
preceding  examples  tell  us  that  when  one  leaves  such  a  regime,  one  loses 
the  determinacy  of  the  solution.  In  a  noncooperative  game  with  a  con- 
tinuum  of players  and  a  continuum  of equilibria,  it  is difficult  to  invoke  an 
argument  to  select  among  the  equilibria,  to judge  any  one  more  likely  than 
another,  or  even  to  rest  assured  that  the  players’  expectations  will  enable 
any  equilibrium  to  be  realized.  Thus,  whether  or  not  the  valuation  of the 
monopolist  is  disjoint  from  the  set  of consumers’  valuations  represents  a 
critical  distinction  for  the  theory. 
Observe  that  among  the  many  equilibria  for  the  linear  demand  case 
there  is only  one  (Example  1) for  which  P, the  function  specifying  the  con- 
sumers’  strategies,  is  continuous.  This  suggests  t  e  following  conjecture:  if 
the  demand  function  f  is continuous  then  there  exists  a  unique  equilibrium 
(T E P(f,  6)  such  that  the  associated  function  P  is  continuous  in  some 
neighborhood  of 1. We  argue  that  such  an  equilibrium  is a salient  predictor 
of  market  behavior,  for  two  reasons.  First,  where  4  is  continuous  the 
equilibrium  specifies  a  pure  strategy  for  the  seIler  off the  equilibrium  path 
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indicate  that  this  class  of equilibrium  selections  is  the  only  plausible  can- 
didate  that  could  ensure  that  small  changes  in  the  data  of the  problem  (e.g., 
variations  in  f)  induce  correspondingly  small  changes  in  the  agents’ 
strategies.  Unfortunately  we have  not  been  able  to  establish  this  conjecture 
in  the  strong  form  mentioned;  instead,  we  establish  uniqueness  of  the 
equilibrium  for  which  P  is  analytic  in  a  neighborhood  of  1,  using  the 
following  construction,  Suppose  that  P  and  P*  specify  equilibrium 
strategies  for  the  consumers  in  the  market  (f,  6),  where f  has  an  nth  order 
derivative  at  1. We  show that  if the  derivatives  of nth  order  at  1 also  exist 
for  P  and  P*,  then  these  derivatives  are  identical.  This  is  then  shown  to 
imply  that  if f  has  continuous  derivatives  of all  orders  at  1, and  P  and  P* 
are  analytic  at  1,  then  P  and  P*  are  identical  functions.  For  instance,  this 
result  confirms  that  in  the  case of linear  demand  the  equilibrium  path  con- 
structed  by  Stokey  [ll],  as in  Example  1, is  the  only  one  sustained  by  an 
analytic  strategy  for  the  consumers. 
THEOREM  2.  Assume  thatf(l)=O,  n>l,f~C”(l),  andf’(l)#O.  COM- 
sider  two  equilibria,  op,  ge  E LY(f,  6) f or  which  P,  Q:  [0,  l]  -+  !4 +  specify 
the stationary  strategies  of the  consumers,  andfor  k  <  n let  Pk  and  Qk  denote 
their  kth  order  derivatives.  Then,  if  Pk(  1)  and  Qk( 1)  exist  they  are  equal. 
Moreover,  if (Vn) f  E C”(l),  and  P  and  Q  are  analytic  in a neighborhood  of 1, 
then (vqE(O,  11) P(q)=Q(q). 
Note.  It  is  easy  to  show that  if  P  is  analytic  in  a  neighborhood  of  1, 
then  for  any  6 and  any  n there  exists  a demand  function  f  E Cn( 1) so that  P 
defines  an  equilibrium  of the  market  (f,  6).  The  equilibrium  so defined  will 
be in  c”(A  6).  This  is  one  way  to  see that  the  analyticity  assumption  does 
not  render  the  problem  vacuous. 
5.  THE  COASE  CONJECTURE 
Finally,  we resolve  the  Coase  conjecture  [2]  with  a  general  result  that 
requires  only  that  the  consumers’  strategies  are  stationary.14 
THEOREM  3  (Coase  conjecture).  For  each  e >  0  there  exists  6<  1  such 
that  for  all  6 >  6 and for  all  equilibria  (r E C”(f,  6),  the first  price  prescribed 
by  0  is less than  E. 
I4 The  theorem  is  stated  for  the  case that f(1)  =O.  Iff(l)  #O,  then  the  statement  need  not 
include  the  hypothesis  that  0 E C”(A  6)  and  the  first  price  prescribed  by v will  be  less than 
f(  1) + a. The  proof  of this case is less difficult  and  follows  the ideas  in  the  first half of the  proof 
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Since  each  consumer  has  the  option  of accepting  the  first  price  offered, 
we obtain  the  following  corollary: 
COROLLARY.  For  each e > 0 there exists 6~  1 such that for  all 6 > 8 and 
for  all equilibria 0 E L”(f,  d),  a consumer  q with  the valuation f(  q) obtains an 
equilibrium pavoff  not  less  than  f(q)  -  E. 
The  proof  of Theorem  3  in  the  Appendix  is  rather  complicated,  so here 
we sketch  a  more  intuitive  line  of argument,  although  it  is  incomplete  in 
several  respects.  The  key  consideration  is  that,  since  the  consumers’ 
equilibrium strategies  are  stationary,  the  monopolist  has  the  option  at  any 
time  to  accelerate  the  process  by  offering  tomorrow’s  price  today  and 
thereby  advancing  the  acceptance  dates  of subsequent  consumers.  The  cost 
of doing  this  is  the  foregone  higher  profit  on  those  consumers  accepting 
today,  whereas  the  benefit  is  the  interest  on  the  monopolist’s  present  value 
of continuation,  which  is  thereby  made  to  arrive  a  day  earlier.  Since  an 
equilibrium  requires  that  exercising  this  option  must  be  disadvantageous 
for  the  monopolist,  we know  that  the  cost  must  exceed  the  benefit.  But  the 
cost  is  approximately  the  price  cut  times  the  number  of  consumers  who 
accept  today’s  price,  and  the  benefit  is  the  daily  interest  on  the  con- 
tinuation  value.  Consequently,  the  daily  interest  on  the  continuation  value 
is  bounded  by  approximately  the  day-to-day  price  drop  times  the  number 
accepting  per  day.  Fix  the  interest  rate  per  unit  time  to  be  loo%,  and 
divide  this  inequality  through  twice  by  the  length  of a  day:  then  the  con- 
tinuation  value  divided  by  the  length  of a day  is bounded  by  the  product  of 
the  rates  (per  unit  time)  at  which  prices  decline  and  consumers  accept.  As 
the  length  of  a day  shrinks,  the  rate  of price  decline  must  be  bounded  or 
consumers  would  prefer  to  wait  rather  than  accept  the  current  price.  If  ?he 
rate  of acceptance  is also  bounded,  then  as the  length  of a day  shrinks  the 
continuation  value  must  also  shrink  to  zero-if  opportunities  remain  for 
the  monopolist  to  reduce  his  price.  If the  continuation  value  shrinks  to  zero 
then  the  monopolist’s  later  prices  must  all  be  converging  to  his  unit  cost, 
and  therefore  his  present  prices  too:  otherwise,  if  the  day  is  sufficiently 
short  then  the  consumers  all  prefer  to  delay  purchasing.  If no  opportunities 
for  further  price  reductions  remain  then  the  price  must  already  be  ar  its 
minimum,  which  is  the  minimal  valuation  among  the  consumers.  The 
remaining  case, therefore,  is that  the  rate  of acceptances  is  unbounded.  But 
in  this  case also  the  prices  offered  by  the  monopolist  must  all  be converging 
downward  to  his  unit  cost  (or  the  consumers’  least  valuation),  since  this  is 
the  only  way that  a positive  fraction  of the  consumers  will  accept  in  each  of 
several  days  when  their  interest  cost  of delay  is small;  that  is,  the  sequence 
of prices  must  become  flat  in  the  limit,  yet  the  sequence  is tied  down  at  the 
end.  In  outline,  this  is  one  interpretation  of the  arguments  supporting  the 
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6.  NOTES 
6.1.  We  demonstrate  that  a  genuine  restriction  is  imposed  by  the 
assumption  that  agents  treat  as equivalent  those  histories  that  differ  only 
by  the  actions  of sets of consumers  of measure  zero.  We  do  so by  showing 
that  for  a  slightly  altered  version  of the  example  in  Section  2,  there  is  an 
equilibrium  in  which  the  monopolist  distinguishes  among  “equivalent” 
histories  and  that  has  a  different  equilibrium  path  than  obtains  if  he  can 
not  make  such  distinctions. 
Alter  the  example  in  Section  2 so that  the  consumers  with  the  valuation 
3  have  measure  2  (rather  than  1).  It  remains  true  that  there  is  an 
equilibrium  in  which  the  sequence  of prices  is  first  2 and  then  1. A  second 
equilibrium  that  distinguishes  among  equivalent  histories  has  a  different 
equilibrium  path,  as  follows:  Consider  the  consumers’  strategies  specified 
by  the  function 
if  qc CO,  $1, 
if  4 E C&21, 
if  qE  (2, 31. 
Suppose  that  the  monopolist  charges  2$ first  and  then  charges  1 provided 
that  all  consumers  q <  $ accept  the  first  offer.  If  one  or  more  of these  con- 
sumers  to  not  accept  the  first  offer,  and  no  other  agent  does  accept,  then 
the  monopolist  next  charges  2 followed  by  the  final  offer  of 1. Observe  that 
the  consumers  q 6  5 can  do  no  better  than  to  accept  the  first  offer  of  2; 
since  their  expectations  of the  subsequent  price  depend  on  whether  or  not 
each  one  accepts.  Thus,  with  an  off-the-equilibrium-path  strategy  for  the 
monopolist  specified  similarly  to  the  original  example,  this  provides  an 
alternative  equilibrium  with  a different  equilibrium  path. 
6.2.  The  formalism  of  Theorems  l-3  and  their  corollaries  accom- 
modates  the  case  of bilateral  bargaining  in  which  a  seller  with  a  known 
valuation  repeatedly  makes  offers  to  a single  buyer  with  a privately  known 
valuation  whose  probability  distribution  is  common  knowledge.  If  F  is the 
cumulative  distribution  function  (assumed  invertible  for  simplicity),  then 
the  buyer  of type  q  has  the  valuation  f(q)  =  F-‘(  I-  4);  that  is,  the  right- 
cumulative  distribution  functions  is  interpreted  as  the  inverse  demand 
function.  The  appropriate  criterion  for  the  bargaining  problem  is  a sequen- 
tial  equilibrium.  For  a  subgame-perfect  equilibrium  of  the  monopoly 
problem,  given  any  price  history  the  residual  demand  in  the  monopoly 
market  defines  the  seller’s  posterior  distribution  of the  buyer’s  type  in  the 
corresponding  sequential  equilibrium  of  the  bargaining  problem  after  the 
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with  repeated  offers  by  the  uninformed  party  have  produced  results  for- 
mally  identical  to  those  obtained  in  analyses  of durable  goods  monopoly; 
see for  example  Fudenberg,  Levine,  and  Tirole  [4]  on  the  one  hand  and 
(for  the  case of linear  demand)  Stokey  [ 1  l]  on  the  other.  This  equivalence 
is  surprising,  since  the  histories  in  the  monopoly  market  include  the  par- 
ticular  sets of consumers  who  have  purchased  at  each  price,  whereas  in  the 
bargaining  problem  the  buyer  says only  “no”  until  he  accepts  and  the  game 
terminates.  In  fact,  our  previous  note  indicates  that  these  two  games  are 
not  formally  identical  in  the  absence  of  our  maintained  hypothesis  that 
agents  do  not  distinguish  among  histories  differing  only  by  the  actions  of 
consumers  (or  types  of the  buyer)  of measure  zero.  In  particular,  the  alter- 
native  equilibrium  described  in  6.1  is  not  a  sequential  equilibrium  for  the 
corresponding  bargaining  model  in  which  a  single  seller  with  valuation  0 
makes  offers  to  a  buyer  who  is twice  as likely  to  have  the  valuation  3 as 1 
and  both  parties  use  the  discount  factor  6 =  +.  Only  with  the  hypothesis 
that  agents  can  not  distinguish  among  equivalent  histories  do  the  two 
models  become  formally  identical. 
With  the  formalism  of this  paper  interpreted  as applying  to  the  bargain- 
ing  problem,  Theorem  1 and  its  corollary  strengthen  a  theorem  of  Fuden- 
berg,  Levine,  and  Tirole  [4]  in  two  ways.  First,  we  dispense  with  their 
assumption  that  the  cumulative  distribution  function  of  the  buyer’s 
valuation  is  differentiable  and  has  a  differentiable  inverse.  More  signifi- 
cantly,  we show that  there  is no  randomization  along  the  equilibrium  path, 
so that  (generically)  there  is  a  determinate  sequence  of price  offersI 
Section  4  can  also  be  interpreted  as applying  to  the  bargaining  problem, 
with  the  added  possibility  that  the  buyer’s  valuation  may  be  no  more  than 
the  seller%.  In  this  case  exchange  may  never  occur  if  there  are  no  gains 
from  trade.  Previous  analysis  of  this  problem  did  not  discover  the 
equilibria  in  Examples  2  and  3.16  The  existence  of  multiple  equilibria 
suggests  a  qualitative  discontinuity  as  the  supports  of the  buyer’s  and  the 
seller’s  valuations  intersect;  this  discontinuity  is  also  likely  to  appear  in 
bargaining  with  alternating  offers.r7 
For  the  case  that  assumption  (B)  is  satisfied,  Theorem  1 proves  both 
existence  and  uniqueness  of  equilibrium.  Fudenberg,  Levine,  and 
Tirole  [4]  provide  an  existence  theorem  for  markets  in  which  the  demand 
function  does  not  satisfy  assumption  (B).  The  idea  of their  proof  is to  con- 
sider  the  limit  of  a  sequence  of equilibria  for  markets  satisfying  (B),  with 
demand  functions  f(.)  +  b  as  b  decreases  to  zero.  The  proof  that  a  limit 
I5 Fudenberg,  Levine,  and  Tirole  [4]  allow  a  random  path  of  price  offers.  wi?h  each  price 
depending  on  the  realizations  of  earlier  price  randomizations. 
I6 See,  for  example,  Sobel  and  Takahashi  [lo]  and  Cramton  133. 
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exists  and  is  an  equilibrium  at  b =  0  is  rather  intricate  and  we have  not 
verified  that  it  would  apply  to  the  more  general  class  of demand  functions 
that  we  admit.  Combined  with  Theorem  1,  however,  application  of  their 
method  may  lead  to  a generalization  of their  existence  theorem. 
6.3.  Stokey  [ 111  analyzes  a model  of durable-good  monopoly  with 
perfect  secondary  markets  using  a  rational  expectations  formulation.  The 
monopolist  chooses  a profit  maximizing  sequence  of cumulative  quantities 
offered.  Deviations  from  the  profit-maximizing  plan  are  important  in  her 
analysis  (hence,  her  use  of  the  term  “perfection”),  but  her  model  is  not 
game-theoretic  since  neither  the  preferences  nor  the  actions  of  the  con- 
sumers  are  modeled  explicitly.  Nevertheless,  her  model  and  ours  specify  the 
same  equilibrium  path.  In  addition  to  providing  game-theoretic  foun- 
dations  for  her  specification,  our  results  can  be  interpreted  as clarifying  the 
general  problem  of  existence  and  uniqueness  of  equilibria  for  her  model. 
Stokey  focuses  on  the  Coase  conjecture  and  the  case of linear  demand.  She 
verifies  the  conjecture  for  the  special  case of the  equilibrium  presented  in 
Example  1. 
6.4.  One  can  define  an  analog  of  our  model  in  which  the 
monopolist  chooses  quantities  rather  than  prices,  and  which  leads  to  the 
same  equilibrium  path  of quantities  and  prices  as in  our  model.  To  do  so in 
a  complete  game-theoretic  formulation  requires  a  specification  of  how 
prices  are  determined  when  a  sequence  of  quantities  is  offered  on  the 
market.  This  is  accomplished  by  adopting  an  auction  procedure.  This  for- 
mulation  leads  to  rather  complicated  strategies  for  the  buyers,  however: 
stationarity  is lost  since  each  consumer’s  bids  change  over  time. 
6.5.  Kahn  [7]  introduces  quadratic  production  costs into  Stokey’s 
model  with  linear  demand  and  considers  the  case that,  as the  period  length 
shrinks,  the  cost  functions  converges  to  the  continuous-time  total  cost 
function 
y[Q(.)l  = c j”m L-Q’(~)12  err  & 
where  Q  is a path  of cumulative  production.  For  the  discrete-time  model  he 
identifies  an  equilibrium  similar  to  Example  1 (that  is,  the  monopolist  ser- 
ves a fraction  of the  remaining  consumers  that  is  invariant  with  respect  to 
the  history).  For  this  equilibrium,  he  observes  that  as  the  period  length 
shrinks  the  monopolist’s  production  path  does  not  converge  to  the  efficient 
path;  and  in  fact  yields  positive  profit,  thus  excluding  an  analog  of  the 
Coase  conjecture.  Kahn’s  result  reinforces  our  theme  that  monopoly  rents 
depend  on  the  monopolist’s  ability  to  commit  to  future  prices  or  sales for 
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production  over  time,  enable  the  monopolist  to  commit  credibly  to  con- 
strain  the  rate  of  supply  offered  in  the  near  future.  Kenneth  Arrow  has 
suggested  to  us  that  decreasing  costs  may  also  provide  means  for  cre 
commitments. 
6.6.  Gul  [6]  studies  the  problem  of dynamic  oligopoly.  He  proves 
that  with  two  or  more  firms  the  perfection  requirement  on  the  seller’s 
strategies  (a  strategy  must  be  profit  maximizing  after  every  history) 
imposes  no  restriction  on  the  total  profits  that  can  be  earned  in 
equilibrium.  This  refutes  the  analog  of  the  Goase  conjecture  for 
ohgopolistic  markets;  moreover,  he  shows  that  there  is  no  tendency 
towards  the  perfectly  competitive  outcome  as  the  number  of  firms  is 
increased  or  the  period  length  shrinks. 
6.7.  We  offer  two  interpretations  of the  utility  functions  of the  con- 
sumers.  In  the  first,  a  consumer  q  receives f(q)  “miles”  at  the  instant  he 
consumes  the  product,  and  he  has  use  for  at  most  one  unit.  Utiles  are 
measured  so that  at  any  time  $1 provides  a flow of utility  having  a present 
value  of  1 utile.  Thus,  if  consumer  q  purchases  in  period  i  at  the  price  p, 
then  he  obtains  the  utility  f(q)  6’  and  gives  up  pi  6’.  The  consumer 
maximizes  utility  by  timing  his  purchase  to  make  the  expectation  of 
[f(q)  -  pi]  6’  as large  as possible.  In  the  second  interpretation  he  obtains 
[11  -S]  f(s)  utiles  per  period  in  each  period  after  purchase,  whereas  one 
unit  of the  numeraire  commodity  (money)  gives  each  consumer  1 -  6 miles 
each  period.  Note  that  the  value  of  one  dollar  held  for  one  period  is 
[ 1 -  S]/S  tomorrow  or  S[(  1 -  S)/6]  =  1 -  6  today.  Thus,  a  consumer  who 
in  period  i  trades  pi  of the  numeraire  for  a unit  of the  durable  commodity 
changes  his  utility  according  to  the  value  of the  stream 
Cl -ap,  O,...,f(q)-Pi,f(q)-P,,...): 
where  the  first  nonzero  element  is  in  period  i.  The  value  of this  stream  is 
[f(q)  -  pi]  6’  and  this  accounts  for  the  form  of the  utility  function. 
The  absence  of infusions  of new demand  into  the  market  is central  to  our 
analysis.  However,  the  model  does  not  require  that  consumers  purchase 
only  one  unit.  The  demand  function  can  just  as  well  be  viewed  as  the 
integral  of the  demand  functions  of consumers.  As a very  special  case, each 
consumer  could  have  the  same  demand  function  fS  in  this  situation  the 
mean  demand  is  also ,fi 
Finally  we observe  that  none  of our  results  depend  substantially  on  the 
assumption  that  the  monopolist  has  the  same  time  preferences  as the  con- 
sumers  On  the  other  hand,  our  methods  do  not  apply  to  the  case that  con- 
sumers’  discount  factors  differ. 
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6.8.  For  the  case  that  f(l)  =  0,  the  possibility  of  non-stationary 
equilibria  follows  from  the  existence  of multiple  stationary  equilibria  such 
as we exhibited  in  Example  3.  Let  IT  and  cr’ be  two  equilibria  in  ZS(f,  6), 
using  P  and  P’  to  define  the  stationary  strategies  of the  consumers  in  the 
two  equilibria.  Assume  that  P  #  P’  and  that  the  monopolist’s  profit  is  not 
less in  0 than  in  0’.  Let  p0 be the  monopolist’s  initial  offer using  cr, and  con- 
sider  the  following  strategy:  If  the  monopolist  charges  p0  initially  then  cr is 
followed  thereafter;  otherwise  cr’  is  followed;  finally  specify  that  the 
monopolist  does  charge  p,,  initially.  Clearly  this  is  an  equilibrium  strategy 
but  is not  a member  of ,Y(f,  a),  since  each  consumer’s  strategy  depends  on 
the  initial  price  offered.  Recalling  from  Example  3  that  a  continuum  of 
equilibria  is  possible,  it  is evident  that  this  approach  enables  the  construc- 
tion  of highly  nonstationary  equilibria  in  which  at  every  time  the  selection 
of the  continuation  depends  on  the  entire  history  of prices. 
APPENDIX:  PROOFS 
Note.  In  all  of  the  following  “equilibrium”  means  “subgame-perfect 
equilibrium.”  Assumptions  (B)  and  (L)  are  assumed  in  Theorem  1 and  its 
preceding  lemmas. 
LEMMA  1.  In  any  equilibrium  IT  and  after  any  history,  if  the  state  in 
period  i  is qi,  then  the present  value  of  the  monopolist’s  expected  profit  is  at 
least  [ 1 -  qi]  f( 1);  that  is 
and  the  monopolist’s  price  prescribed  by  CT  is at  least f(  1). 
Proof:  It  is sufficient  to  observe  that  in  equilibrium  all  of the  consumers 
accept  the  price  f(  1).  Suppose  this  were  not  so,  and  for  any  selected 
equilibrium  let  c d f  (1)  be  the  supremum  of the  prices  that  will  be  accepted 
by  all  consumers  (except  possibly  for  a  set  of  measure  zero)  after  any 
history.  If  c =  f(  1)  and  a  positive  measure  of  consumers  reject  c then  no 
optimal  strategy  exists  for  the  monopolist,  so  assume  that  c <f(l).  An 
optimal  strategy  for  the  monopolist  can  not  specify  an  offer  less  than  c, 
since  any  such  offer  is  less than  an  offer  that  is  sure  to  be  accepted  by  all 
remaining  consumers.  Consider  the  offer p =  [ 1 -  S] f  (1) +  6~. By  construc- 
tion,  each  consumer  prefers  the  offer  p-e  now  to  an  anticipated  offer  c 
later.  But  notice  that  p -  E >  c for  small  E >  0  since  c < f (1).  Therefore,  p -  E 
will  be  accepted  now  by  every  consumer.  Since  this  is  true  for  every  date 
and  history,  the  definition  of  c  as  a  supremum  is  contradicted.  Thus  we 
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LEMMA  2.  There  exists q <  1  such that  in  any  equilibrium  and  in  any 
period  i after  any  history,  if  the state  is qi>  q and the next  periods state is 
4i+1 when the actions prescribed by  the equilibrium strategies are taken, then 
qi+1=1. 
Pro?fi  Since  the  functionfis  Lipschitzian  at  1, there  exists  q* <  1 and  k 
such  that  if 4 >  q*  then 
Given  any  equilibrium  CJ  and  any  history,  if qi is the  state  and  p, is the  price 
prescribed  by  CJ, then  the  state  qi+ 1  in  the  next  period  will  satisfy 
qiGqi+ll  <  1,  and  since  f  is  left-continuous  and  consumer  q  does  not 
purchase  at  price  pi if pi > f(q), 
f(4i+  1) 3 Pi.  (2) 
Since  every  consumer  remaining  in  the  market  in  period  i +  1 at  state  qi+  , 
has  a  valuation  not  exceeding  f(qj+  I ), we obtain 
R”(qi)  G  [I4i+  1  -4i1  Pi+6111 -4,+ilf(4i+iL  (3) 
By  Lemma  1  and  Eqs.  (3),  (2),  and  then  (1)  above,  if  13  qi+ 1  3 ql>  q* 
then 
02  C1-4ilf(~)-wqi) 
~C1-4Jf(l)-Cq;+,  -4ilf(4,+1)-6[1-qi+Ilf(4,+i) 
3  [II  -4;lf(l)-  c4i+, -qil(fU)+W  -qi+,l) 
-sll-q,+,IIf(l)+kC1-q,+,]) 
3  [~-~][~-q~+~If(l)-[q~+~-qil~l-q,;~lk-~C~-~~+: 
~C1-qi+~l(C1-61f(l)-C1-qilk-~11-4ilk). 
‘k 
The  term  in  the  last  bracket  is  positive  for  all  sufficiently  small  values  of 
1 -qi.  Therefore,  there  exists  q <  1  such  that  qi3  q  implies  that 
1  -qj+1  =o.  1 
DEFINITION.  A  pair  (q, P)  is  a reservation price  strategy  if it  satisfies  the 
following  three  properties: 
(i)  Odq<l,  and  P:  [q,  l]  -+‘%++  is  non-increasing  and  left-con- 
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In  any  equilibrium  and  in  any  period  i after  any  history,  if qi is  the  state 
and  4 >  q,  and  if  the  monopolist  offers any  price  p  in  period  i,  then 
(ii)  if p<  P(q)  then  qi+l  >S,  and 
(iii)  if p >  P(q)  then  qi+  I <  4. 
LEMMA  3.  There  exists  a reservation  price  strategy  pair  (q,  P). 
ProoJ:  Define  P(q)  =  [ 1 -  S]  f(q)  +  Sf( 1)  for  all  4 E [q,  11,  where  q  is 
defined  as in  the  statement  of Lemma  2.  Obviously  P  satisfies  (i).  Assume 
that  pi <  P(q)  and  qi+ 1 <  4; then  consumer  4 does  not  buy  in  period  i. The 
greatest  utility  that  4 can  obtain  is bounded  by 
If(c+f(l)l  @+I=  If(s)-(l-s)f(4)-6f(l)l@ 
= Cf(a -  p(q)1 6’ 
< [f(s)  -  Pi1 6’; 
hence,  4  should  purchase  the  good  in  period  i,  which  contradicts  utility 
maximization.  Similarly,  if pi >  P(q)  and  qi+  1 3  4  then  from  the  fact  that 
qi+  1 >  4 >  q and  from  Lemma  2,  we know  that  qi+  1 =  1. Thus,  pi + 1 will  be 
f(  1).  As before, 
Mid-f(l)1  hi+‘=  Cf(4)-P(~)l  hi> 
so 
Loa  -  Pi1 8-c  IIf(d  -f(l)1  dffl. 
Since  f  is  left-continuous,  the  above  inequality  also  holds  for  some  q’ <q, 
and  so  by  utility  maximization  the  consumer  q’  must  not  buy  in  period  i. 
This  contradicts  the  fact  that  qi+  I 3  4.  1 
DEFINITION.  Fix  a reservation  price  strategy  pair  (r,  P)  and  define 
and  specify  the  constrained  maximization  problem: 
where  59 is  the  set  of sequences  { Qj,  rcj},,?=  0 satisfying  the  constraints 
Q*=!Z  r<Q,,  QjGQj+,Gl,  ~,QGP(Q,+~).  (Cl DYNAMICMONOPOLY 
Also,  define 
LEMMA  4.  For  any  reservation  price  strategy  pair  (r,  P)  the  constrained 
maximization  problem  [(A)  subject  to  (C)]  has a  solution  and  any  solution 
has  the  property  that  (Vj)  nj=  P(Q,+  1) and  Qj+l  >  Q,  (or  Q,=  Qj+  1 =  1). 
Further,  there  exists  r’  <  r  (or  r’ =  r =  0)  such  that  in  any  equilibrium  and  in 
any  state  qi >  r’  in  any  period  i  after  any  history, 
R”(qJ  =  Z(q,). 
The  set  of solutions  has  the properties  that 
irlfM(Q)EM(Q)  and  Q’>  Q  E M(Q)  =+ P(Q’)  <  P(Q).  (ii) 
If  qi =  Q  >  r’  then  the  next  state  is qi+  1 E M(  &).  The function 
P(Q)zP(infM(Q)) 
is non-increasing  and  left-continuous;  in  particular,  ff  Q  > 0  then 
P’ E P(M!al  and  p2 E P(M(Q))  *  p1 3 p2.  (iii) 
Proof.  That  (A)  has  a solution  follows  from  the  fact  ihat  P  is left-con- 
tinuous  and  non-increasing.  That  rci=  P(Q,+  I)  and  (if  Qj  <  1)  that 
Qj+l  >  Q,  are  obvious. 
We  first  establish  (i).  Let  { Qj,  z,}&  be  a  solution  to  (A)  for  Q  =  qt. 
Suppose  that  R”(q,)  =  Z(q,)  -  8 for  some  E >  0, and  set g, +, =  71,  -  $2.  If the 
monopolist  follows  the  strategy  ( pi+,),X;O  after  period  i,  then  the  present 
value  of his  profit  is  at  least 
2  Pi+jCQj+l-Qjl  si=Z(qi)-[11--ilE/2>R”(q,), 
j=O 
which  contradicts  the  optimality  of  the  monopolist’s  plan.  Hence, 
R”(qi)  3  zCqil  f or  all  qie  [0,  11.  On  the  other  hand,  if  qi3  r  then  the  p’s 
and  q’s  specified  by  the  equilibrium  strategy  c  are  feasible  for  (A);  hence, 
also  R”(qj)  ,< Z(q,).  We  will  now use the  fact that  if qi <  Y and  CJ{  + i <  r then 
R”(qi)  < Cr -  q,lf(o)  + aZ(r). 
For  qi  sufficiently  close  to  r, 
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which  is  a contradiction.  Thus,  if  qi  is  suffkiently  close  to  Y then  qi+  1 >  r; 
and  hence,  once  again  the  p’s  and  q’s  specified  by  0  are  feasible  for  (A), 
implying  that  R”(q,)  d  Z(qi),  which  proves  the  desired  result. 
To  show that  m =  inf M(Q)  E M(Q),  we begin  with  the  observation  that 
M(Q)  is  bounded  and  that  m >  r.  Let  {x~}?=~  c  M(Q)  be  a  decreasing 
sequence  converging  to  m.  Since  P  is  left-continuous  and  non-increasing, 
p*  =  lim  P(x,)  <  P(m).  From  the  definition  of M, 
-m  = fYx,)t-x, -  !a  + Wx,), 
for  all  t.  Since  Z  is continuous, 
Z(Q)  =  p*[m  -  Q]  +  6Z(m). 
Ifp*<P(m)  then 
Z(!2)  < P(m)Cm -  01  + Wm), 
which  contradicts  the  definition  of Z(o)  and  the  principle  of optimality  of 
dynamic  programming.  Hence  P(m)  =  p*,  implying  that  m  E M(e). 
If  (2’ >  Q  E M(  0)  then  it  is  obvious  that  P(Q)  >  P(Q’).  Furthermore, 
note  that  Q=  qi>r’  implies  that  qi+l  EM(Q),  using  R”(q,)=  Z(q,)  as 
established  earlier  and  the  principle  of optimality. 
Finally,  we  establish  (iii).  If  p1 E P(M(e)),  p2  E P(M(Q)),  Q  >  g,  and 
p1  <  p’,  then  there  exist  x1 E M(o)  and  x2 E M(Q)  such  that  P(xl)  <  P(x2). 
(Since  P  is non-increasing  this  implies  that  x,  >  x2.)  Therefore, 
-w2)  2 P(x2)L-x2  -  &I  + 6Z(%) 
=  P(x2)CQ  -  (21+ f’(x,)[xz  -  Ql  +=(x,) 
=WdCQ-~l+~z(Q,~ 
Similarly, 
Z(Q)  2  -P(x,)CQ  -  (zl + 6Z(&), 
so 
hence 
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which  is  a  contradiction.  Thus  we  have  established  that  p’  E P(M(Q)), 
p*  EP(M(Q)),  and  Q  >  Q  imply  that  p1 3  p2.  Since  inf  M(Q)  EM(Q)  and 
inf M(Q)  E M(Q)  we have  P(Q)  E P(M(Q))  and  p(Q)  E P(A4(Q)).  Using  the 
result  stated  in  the  previous  sentence,  Q  >  Q  implies  p(Q)  >  P(Q);  that  is, 
P  is  non-increasing. 
Now  let  (x~)??~  be  an  increasing  sequence  converging  to  Q  and  define 
p*  =  lim  P(x,). 
t-m 
The  limit  exists  since  p  is  non-increasing.  Define  y, =  infM(x,)  for  all  t. 
Then  ( y,}  has  a  convergent  subsequence  and  without  loss  of  generality 
assume  that  (v,}  converges  to  y.  Since  p  is  non-increasing  we  have 
p*  d  P(Q);  also, 
for  all  t.  Since  Z  is continuous, 
Since  P  is  non-increasing  and  left-continuous  we  have  p*  6  P(v).  If 
p*  <  P(u)  then  substituting  P(u)  into  the  preceding  equality  contradicts 
the  defining  property  of  Z,  so p*  =  P(v).  Thus,  y E M(Q)  and  therefore 
a(Q)  <P(y)  =  p*,  proving  that  p*  =  p(Q)  and  establishing  the  left-con- 
tinuity  of P.  1 
Notation.  In  the  following  we  let  P(.;  (Y, P))  and  M(.;  (Y, P))  be  the 
functions  P  and  M  as defined  in  Lemma  4  using  (Y, P)  as  the  reservation 
price  strategy  pair. 
LEMMA  5.  If  (q, P)  is a reservation  price  strategy  pair  satisfying  the  con- 
sumer-equilibrium  property” 
(vq  3  4)  P(q)=  C~-~lf(4~+my;  (cl3  Pfl  (CE) 
and  q >  0,  then  there  exists  a  reservation  price  strategy  pair  (q’,  P’)  with 
q’ <q  that  also  satisfies  (CF)  for  which  P’(g)  =  P(q)  for  all  4 2  q. 
ProoJ:  For  all  4 E [0,  l]  define 
p’(q) = Cl -  81  f(4) + eq;  (4, PII. 
Note  that  P’  is  left-continuous  and  non-increasing.  Furthermore,  since 
(q, P)  satisfies  (CE)  we know  that  P’(q)  =  P(q)  whenever  q 3  q. 
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We  now  show  that  there  exists  q’ <  q  such  that  (q’3 P’)  satisfies  (CE) 
Fact  (ii)  of  Lemma  4  establishes  the  existence  of  q’ <q  such  that  in  an! 
equilibrium  cs and  after  any  history,  if  the  state  qi3  q’  and  qi=  4  ther 
qi+  1 E MC?;  (4, f’)),  where  qi+  I  is the  state  in  period  2-k 1. Observe  that  thy 
argument  used  in  proving  this  result  establishes  that  M($  jq,  P))  = 
M(q;  (q’,  P’))  for  all  4 3  q’,  so  also 
inf  M(q;  (q, P))  =  inf  M(&  (q’3 P’)) 
for  all  4 >  q’.  By  definition,  inf M(q;  (q, P))  2  q;  hence, 
P($  (q’,  P’))  =  P’(inf  M(q;  (q’,  P’))) 
=P(infW$  (4, P)))= 
and  so 
P’(4) = El -  61 f(d  + Q.(q; (4’2 P’I) 
for  all  4 2  q’.  Therefore  (q’,  P’)  satisfies  (CE). 
Next  we prove  that  (q’,  P’)  satisfies  (ii)  of  Lemma  3;  that  is,  we 
that  qi<4,  S>q’,  and  pi<  P’(q)  imply  that  qi+  1 >tj.  If  934  then, 
P’(q)  =  P(g),  the  fact  that  (q, P)  satisfies  (ii)  impiies  that  also  (q’,  P’) 
satisfies  (ii).  Now  suppose  that  4 <q.  By  the  definition  of q’$  if  qi+  I  3  q’ 
then  qi+2EM(q,p,;(q,  P))  and  hence  qi+z3q>q.  If  q>qi+I  then 
qi+2>4>4i+li  that  is,  consumer  4  buys  in  period  it  1.  ut,  if  0 
prescribes  pi+  1 then  by  Lemma  4, 
Pi+  1=  P(q,+,)  E  fYMq,+  1);  (4,  PI). 
Recall  that  I’(&  (q,  P))E  P(M(q);  (q, P))  and  ?>  qi+  1  so  by  (iii)  of 
Eemma  4, pi+  1  ,  >  p(q;  (q, P)).  However  by  the  definition  of P’, 
Cf(q)-P’(q)l  d’=  Cf(~u?%  (4%  J?)l  d’+‘, 
SO 
Mid  -  Pi1 iv>  Cf(lr~  -Pi+  11  a’+ l. 
Thus,  consumer  q prefers  buying  in  period  i  to  buying  in  period  i +  1, con- 
tradicting  utility  maximization.  (For  the  case that  4 <q  and  qi+  1 <  q’,  (ii) 
is  established  by  considering  pk,  where  qk  <  S  and  qk + 1 3  4.) 
Finally,  we  show  that  (q’,  P’)  satisfies  (iii)  of  Lemma  4.  Assume  that 
qi <  4,  B >  q’,  pi  >  P(q),  and  qi+  1 3  q’.  If  q 3  q then,  since  P’(q)  =  P(q),  the 
fact  that  (q, P)  satisfies  (iii)  yields  the  result  that  (q’,  P’)  also  saiisfies  (iii). DYNAMIC  MONOPOLY  481 
Suppose,  therefore,  that  4 <  q  and  thus  qi+  1 >  4 >  ql. 
we obtain 
Since  f  is  left-continuous  we  can  find  q*  E (qi,  cl)  for  which  the  above 
inequality  also  holds:  that  is consumer  q*  would  rather  buy  in  period  is  1 
than  in  period  i.  But  qi <  q*  <  qi+  1 means  that  q*  buys  in  period  i,  con- 
tradicting  utility  maximization.  1 
THEOREM  1.  If  f  satisfies  (B)  and  (L)  therz  there  exist  A  c  [O, 11, 
t:  [lo,  l]  -+  [0,  11,  and  P:  [0,  l]  -+%++  such  that  {qi,  pij,“,o  is  an 
equilibrium  path  if  and  onZy  if  q. = 0,  q1 E A,  (Vi>,  1)  qi+ 1  =  f(qi),  and 
(vi30)  pj=p(qi+l). 
ProoJ:  First  note  that  Lemma  3  assures  the  existence  of  a  reservation 
price  strategy  pair  (q, P).  Lemma  5  establishes  that  any  such  pair  can  be 
extended  to  a  larger  interval  domain  (smaller  q)  and  retain  the  same 
properties,  including  condition  (CE);  furthermore,  it  is clear  that  the  lower 
limit  of such domains  is not  bounded  away from  zero.  Hence,  one  such  pair 
has  q=  0  and  satisfies  (CE).  Any  other  reservation  price  strategy  pair 
(0, P’)  has  P’(q)  =  P(q)  for  all  4 E (0,  1).  Set  A =  M(O)  and  (‘~‘4 E [O,  I]) 
t(4)  =inf  M(Lp).  We  claim  that  (A,  b, P)  has  the  properties  required  by 
Theorem  1. 
First  we  prove  the  “only  if”  part  of  the  statement.  Let  (T  be  any 
equilibrium.  By  (i)  in  Lemma  4,  R”(O)  =  Z(O),  and  so  q1  E M(O)  = A.  Also 
by  Lemma  4, PO =  P(q,).  We  next  show that  PI  + i =  P(t(q;+  1)) for  all i 2 0. 
BY  Lemma4  we  have  R”(q,)=Z(qJ,  qr+l EM(~J,  pi=P(q,+,P,  and 
4  /Cl > q, (or  qi=  1)  for  all  i3  0.  Since  (0, P)  satisfies  (CE)  we have 
and  since  an  interval  of consumers  purchase  in  each  period,  the  left  con- 
tinuity  of  f  and  utility  maximization  by  the  consumers  imply  that 
Pi+1  A  >  &qi+  ,)-otherwise  some  consumer  4  would  not  purchase  in 
period  i. But  p(qi+,)  =  P(inf  M(qi+  r))  and  P is non-increasing,  so f’(ql+  I) 
is  the  largest  optimal  price  in  period  i+  1.  Thus,  pi+  1 <  l?(q,+ 1  ),,  which 
proves  that  pi+  1 =&?,+l)=w(qi+lf). 
Finally,  observe  that  if  x =  inf M(q,+  I ) E M(gj+  1  )  then  qi + z 3 x,  since 
qit2  f M(q,+  r).  But 
P(X)=P(t(qj+l))=Pi+1=P(q,+2). 
Hence,  if qi + 2 >  x  then 
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which  contradicts  (ii)  of Lemma  4. Therefore 
which  completes  the  proof  of the  “only  if’  part  of the  statement. 
To  prove  the  “if’  part  of the  statement,  choose  q1 E M(0)  and p,, =  P(ql), 
and  define  strategies  0  as follows: 
The  consumers.  After  any  history,  if  the  state  is  qi  then  consumer 
q~  (qj,  l]  buys  if  and  only  if pi  6  P(q). 
The monopolist.  After  any  history,  if the  state  is qi then  pi =  P( t(qi))  if 
pi-  1 >  P(qi),  and  otherwise  pi  is  chosen  randomly  to  be  either  &qi)  with 
probability  b  or  pi  with  probability  1 -  p  where 
PI =  FLY, f(q), 
x =  vly  f(4), 
/?=  L-1) 
if  x-P~-~  <  [x-8(qi)lS 
otherwise, 
and  p(p)  is  the  solution  to 
x-p=~[x-P(qi)]s+(l-~)[x-p~]s. 
First  we note  that  p E [0,  11. If  fi #  1 then 
X-pi-1  3  [x-p(qj)16; 
hence  it  suffices  to  show that 
Recall  that,  for  all  q, 
f(4)  -  P(q) = u-(q)  -  ml  4 
and  therefore, 
)E  u-(q)  -  P(q)1 = y:  [f(q)  -  ml  6 
and 
x -  hi  P(q)  =  [x  -  PI]  6. 
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Next  we observe  that  after  any  history  resulting  in  a state  qi  in  period  i, 
the  monopolist  charges  either  p(qi),  pI,  or  a  mixture  of  the  two.  The 
optimality  of p(qi)  follows  from  its  definition  and  Lemma  4.  To  prove  the 
optimality  of  p1  we  first  note  that  inf M(q)  is  a  non-decreasing 
function-using  the  argument  made  in  proving  that  p  is  non-increasing. 
Let  {xl>  be  a  decreasing  sequence  converging  qi and  define  yt  =  inf  M(x,) 
and  y =  lim  yt.  Then 
and 
which,  since  Z  is  continuous,  implies  that 
z(qi)  =  PIE Y -  4il+  6z( V). 
Thus  P(y)  d  pl,  proving  that  P(y)  =  p,.  This  shows  that  pI  is  an  optimal 
price  in  state  qi.  Since  p(qJ  and  pr  are  optimal,  every  randomization 
between  them  is also  optimal.  This  establishes  that  the  specified  strategy  for 
the  monopolist  is  optimal. 
To  prove  optimality  of  the  consumers’  strategy  we  first  show  that  the 
consumers  never  regret  not  purchasing  when  their  strategy  prescribes  not 
to  purchase.  Consider  any  history  resulting  in  a  state  qi in  period  i,  and  a 
price  pi  offered  by  the  monopolist.  If  pi >  P(q)  for  some  4 E (  qi,  11  then 
4i+i  <  4  and  the  (possibly  random)  price  pi+  1 that  will  follow  is  such  that 
it  makes  consumer  qi+  1 indifferent  between  buying  in  period  i  or  period 
i +  1. Hence, 
so 
implying 
t-f(cli+1)-Pil  ~‘=E{f(q,+,I-Pm}  hi+‘; 
Cf(qi+I)-PiIt?=  [If(q,+k-E{A+,}l  di+‘; 
[f(q)-pi]  6’~  [f(q)-E(pi+,)j  6”“. 
Thus  consumer  4 does  not  regret  not  buying  in  period  i,  since  he  can  do  at 
least  as well  by  waiting  an  additional  period. 
Finally  we prove  that  consumers  do  not  regret  purchasing  whenever  the 
strategy  r~ prescribes  that  they  purchase.  After  any  history  resulting  in  state 
ql in  period  i  the  strategy  r~ prescribes  that  consumer  4 E (qi,  13 buys  if and 
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according  to  0, pi  is  followed  by  a  sequence  of  non-random  prices  pi  and 
states  qj,  j>  i.  In  this  case, 
Cf(Sj+I)-Pjl  s’=  iX4j+l)-Pj+ll  $+‘T 
for  all  j  >  i.  Since  qj+  1 3  4 for  all  j  >  i, 
f(4)-Pi3  [f(4)-Pj+Il  b  (Vj 3  i). 
It  follows  that 
[f(4)-Pi1  6i3  U”(4)-Pj+ll  bj+l  (Vj  2  i), 
which  establishes  the  required  result.  On  the  other  hand,  if pi  is followed  by 
a nondegenerate  random  variable  ai + i , then 
Cf(qi+1)-Pi1  hi=  U-k++E{A+,)l  difl, 
and  qi+  r 3  4.  Hence,  consumer  4 likes  buying  in  period  i  at  least  as much 
as  waiting  for  the  next  period;  and  repeating  the  reasoning  above  he 
weakly  prefers  any  outcome  of the  randomization  to  any  price  that  follows. 
This  establishes  the  optimality  of buying  in  period  i  for  consumer  4  and 
completes  the  proof.  1 
THEOREM  2.  Assume  thatf(l)=O,  n>l,f~C”(l),  andf’(l)#O.  Con- 
sider  two  equilibria  op,  aQ E C”(f,  6)  for  which  P,  Q:  [0,  l]  +  %+  specify 
the stationary  strategies  of  the  consumers,  andfor  k  <  n let  Pk  and  Qk  denote 
their  kth  order  derivatives.  Then,  if  Pk(l)  and  Qk( 1)  exist  they  are  equal. 
Moreover,  if (Vn) f  E C”(l),  and  P  and  Q  are analytic  in  a neighborhood  of  1, 
then  (vq E (0,  11)  f’(q)  =  Q(q). 
ProoJ:  Recallthatf(q)~P(q)3[1-6]f(q)andf(l)=O;consequently 
P(1)  =  0,  and  since  f’(1)  #  0,  P’(  1) #  0.  Choose  E >O  such  that 
P~f?([i-E,  11).  Define  Z(q)  for  qE  [l-e,  l]  as  in  Lemma4  of 
Theorem  1, and  define 
atI32  4) =  P(tdCtll-  41+  =7t,) 
for  all  q E [ 1 -  E, 1 ]  and  to E [q,  11.  Since  P  is  continuously  differentiable 
and  P’(  1) #  0,  for  q sufficiently  close  to  1, Z  is strictly  concave  in  t,. Hence 
the  function 
t(4) = arg ,o~rl,  .3b,  4) 
is  well  defined  and  Z’(q)  =  -P(t(q))  by  a  standard  result  in  dynamic 
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establishes  that  after  any  i-period  history  resulting  in  state  qi,  if  qi  is  suf- 
ficiently  close  to  1  then  the  price  in  period  i  will  be  P(t(qJ).  Hence,  t 
defines  the  strategy  of  the  monopolist  for  states  sufficiently  close  to  1. 
Therefore,  for  such  q  we have  by  consumer  optimality 
P(q) = Cl -  61  f(4) + dP(t(q)). 
Since  PE C’(l),  profit  maximization  implies  that 
~zl&l=  P’(t(q))[t(q)  -  41 + PCt(qI) + dZ’(f(qI)  = 0 
for  q close  to  1. Substituting  expressions  from  above  yields 
P’(t(q))Ct(q)  -  41+  Cl -  81  f(4s))  = 0.  (2) 
Since  P’(  1) #  0,  applying  the  implicit  function  theorem  to  Eq.  (1)  yields 
that  t has  the  same  order  of differentiability  as P;  that  is,  t E c”(1). 
Eq.  (2)  implies,  using  l’H8pital’s  rule,  that 
P’(l)=  _  Cl-a.?(l)  t’(l) 
t’(l)-  1 
Differentiating  Eq.  (1)  implicitly,  evaluating  it  at  q =  1, and  using  Eq.  (3) 
yields 
t’(l)=  (1-,/‘1-6)/6  and  P’(l)=f’(l)  Ji-z. 
Repeating  the  argument  for  Q  and  the  corresponding  s associated  with  Q 
yields  the  same  conclusion;  therefore  P’(  1) =  Q’(  1)  and  t’(1)  =  s’( I  ).  To 
complete  the  proof  of the  first  part  of the  theorem  it  suffices  to  show that 
Bk(l)=Qk(l)  and  t”(l)=?(l)  for  all  k<n-1  implies  that  B”(l)=Q”(l) 
and  r”(l)  =  s”(1).  Observe  that  Eq.  (2)  implies,  for  q  close  to  1, that 
P’(t(q))Ct(q)  -  41+  [I1 -  61 f(t(q))  -  P’b(4))C~64) -  43 
-  C1-~l.mq))=0.  (43 
Differentiating  Eq.  (4)  n -  1 times,  dividing  the  result  by  t(q)  -4,  and  tak- 
ing  the  limit  as  q--f  1,  one  obtains  a  linear  equation  in  the  variables 
[QX(l)-P(l)]  and  [s”(l)-  t”(l)].  Also,  from  Eq.  (1)  we have 
P(q) -  Wt(q))  -  Q(4)  + @m(q)) = 0.  (5) 
Differentiating  Eq.  (5)  M  times  and  evaluating  the  result  at  1 we obtain  a 
second  linear  equation.  This  pair  of equations  forms  a homogeneous  linear 
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the  first  derivatives  off,  P,  at  1, and  is nonzero  for  all  ~1.  This  implies  that 
P”(  1) =  Q’(  1)  and  t”( 1) =  s”( 1 ), as desired  to  complete  the  induction. 
To  prove  the  second  part  of  the  theorem,  observe  that  if f’(  1) #  0  and 
f~  C”( 1) for  all  n then  by  the  previous  argument  all  derivatives  of P  and  Q 
at  1 are  equal.  If  P  and  Q  are  analytic  in  some  neighborhood  of 1 then,  for 
some  E >  0,  P(q)  =  Q(q)  for  all  q E [ 1 -  E, 11.  Following  the  result  from 
Theorem  1 that  P  can  be  extended  uniquely  from  such  an  interval  to  the 
interval  (0,  l]  yields  that  P(q)  =  Q(q)  for  all  q E (0,  11,  as required.  1 
THEOREM  3  (Coase  conjecture).  For  each  E >  0  there  exists  8~  1  such 
that  for  all  6 >  6  and for  all  equilibria  0 E ,Y(f,  6),  the first  price  prescribed 
by  g  is  less  than  E. 
ProoJ:  Let  0,  rl,  rz,...  be  an  ordering  of the  rational  Z? in  the  interval 
[0,  11. If  the  theorem  is false  then  there  exists  E >  0  such  that  for  all  2  >  0 
there  exists  A <  2  and  P,  such  that  PA(O)  >  a. Here,  P,  is  the  P-function 
associated  with  an  equilibrium  in  ZS(f,  6).  Consider  any  sequence  A,  +  0 
such  that  PA,(O)  >  E  for  all  y1=  1, 2,... .  Select  a  convergent  subsequence 
{PA,(O)}  and  define  P(0)  =  limi,  o. PA,(O).  Now  from  the  sequence 
{ Pd,(rI  ) }  select  a  convergent  subsequence  with  a  limit  defined  to  be  P(r,). 
Continue  in  this  fashion  to  define  P  on  all  the  rationals  9  in  [0,  11.  Extend 
B  to  the  entire  interval  by  imposing  left-continuity.  Note  that  from  the 
procedure  used  to  construct  is  and  the  fact  that  P,”  is  non-increasing  for 
each  M,  it  follows  that  also  P  is  non-increasing.  In  the  following,  let 
J=eprA. 
We  first  show that  assuming  the  function  is so constructed  is  continuous 
yields  a contradiction.  Thus,  suppose  that  P  is continuous.  Then  there  exist 
x1  and  x,>x,  such  that 
P(0)  >  P(x,)  2  P(x,)  >  0, 
and  consequently  there  exist  0 <a  <  b <  c such  that 
P(O)>c>b>P(x,)2P(x,)>a>O. 
By  the  nature  of the  construction  of P,  there  exists  a subsequence  {Ai)  and 
an  integer  N  such  that,  for  all  i >  N, 
PAi  ’  c  and  pA/(xl)>  pA,(x2)  E  (a>  b). 
If  the  monopolist  initially  charges  the  price  c  then,  for  i>  N  consumer  0 
accepts  in  the  equilibrium  associated  with  Ai.  From  the  utility 
maximization  of consumer  0,  at  least  t  units  of time  must  pass before  the 
price  falls  to  b,  where  t  is  defined  by 
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Since  at  least  t  units  of  time  must  pass  between  prices  c and  b  after  c is 
charged,  the  profit  left  in  the  market  for  the  monopolist  facing  P,,.  i >  N, 
when  he  follows  the  equilibrium  strategy,  is  at  most 
where  q’(c)  is  the  state  of the  market  after  c is  charged,  and  R’(x,)  is  the 
present  value  of  the  monopolist’s  profits  beginning  from  state  x,-both 
according  to  the  equilibrium  associated  with  dj. 
We  next  observe  that  there  exist  t^<  t/2  and  an  integer  I>  N  such  that 
e -?+  -f  P,,(h,)p  -  Cc)  P,,i  <  a[x,  -  .x1][ep”‘2  -e-q  ml 
j=l 
where K  is the  largest  integer  that  does  not  exceed  l/Ai,  h,=qi(c),  h,=x,, 
the  his  are equally  spaced,  and  ,U =  [xi  -  q’(c)]/K.  (This  is little  more  than 
the  statement  that  the  integral  of the  uniformly  bounded,  left-continuous 
function  PA,  can  be  approximated  uniformly  by  Riemann  sums;  for,  the 
right  side  of (II)  is independent  of 1 and  i, e -”  is close  to  1 for  Z small,  and 
K  is large  for  2 fixed  and  i large.) 
We  are  now  able  to  construct  a  plan  that  yields  the  monopolist  more 
profit  than  he  obtains  from  the  prescribed  bahavior  in  the  equilibrium 
associated  with  A,  after  c is  charged,  and  thereby  obtain  a  contradiction. 
This  is  achieved  by  having  the  monopolist  spend  r^ units  of  time  getting 
from  q{(c)  to  x1  and  then  following  the  strategy  prescribed  in  the 
equilibrium  associated  with  A,.  According  to  (II),  his  profit  will  then  be  at 
least 
J”‘,  P3,-a[x-xl][e-“/2-e-“]  +e-“R’(x,). 
Y’(,) 
But  since  r^< t/2  and  R’(x,)  >  4x2  -x,1,  the  profit  from  this  plan  will 
exceed  the  bound  on  the  profit  given  in  (I)  for  the  hypothesized 
equilibrium  strategy. 
To  get  a contradiction  for  the  case that  P  is  discontinuous,  observe  first 
that  B  is  continuous  at  1,  so  if x  is  a  point  of discontinuity  then  x <  1.19 
NOW  choose  CI so that  ph >  pr,  where 
ph=liI$(q)-tl  and  p/  =  FE  P(q)  +  2. 
I9  The  contirmity  of  P  at  1  follows  from  the  fact  that  f  is  ieft-contirmous,  P(1)  =f(I)  and 
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The  existence  of such  an  CI is guaranteed  by  the  fact  that  P  is  non-increas- 
ing  and  x  is a point  of discontinuity.  Observe  that  since  P(q)  <f(q)  for  all 
4 E 9  and  f  is  left-continuous,  there  exists  q >  0  such  that  x +  y/2  <  1 and 
p,, <f(x  -  q).  Hence,  there  exists  t >  0  that  solves 
By  utility  maximization  of  consumers,  in  any  equilibrium  if  a  consumer 
with  a  valuation  no  greater  than  f(x  -  y)  purchases  at  price  ph,  then  at 
least  a duration  t  must  pass before  the  price  falls  to  pr. 
For  all  E E (0, r]) choose  qt  E (x -  s/2, X)  n  9  and  qf: E (x, x +  5’2)  n  2.  Let 
{AEi}j~O  be  a  subsequence  of  {Ai}:,  such  that 
lim  PAe,(qi  =  P(q3, 
j  +  cc 
lim  p&L)  =  P(d). 
j+  m 
The  existence  of  such  a  sequence  is  guaranteed  by  the  construction  of  is. 
Pick  n  such  that 
pd,(q:)  ’  Ph  and  PA,,(d)  ’  P/e 
Suppose  that  p,,  is charged  in  the  initial  period.  Since  P&q:)  >  p,,,  by  the 
fashion  in  which  PA,,  defines  the  strategies  of  consumers,  all  consumers 
q 6  qt  buy  at  this  price.  Observe  that  qi  >  x -  r] when  E >  y;  hence,  if price 
p,,  is  charged  in  the  initial  period  then  there  will  be  consumers  with 
valuations  no  greater  than  f(x-  y)  that  buy,  and  therefore  at  least  a 
duration  t must  elapse  before  the  price  falls  below pi.  In  other  words,  there 
will  be at  least  t/A,,  price  offers before  a price  below pI  can  be charged.  Let 
Pl>  P2m  Pm  be  the  prices  above  p,  that  follow  ph  according  to  the 
equilibrium.  Define 
aO=ph 
26  a,=p,,-ii  t  [P/7-P/1> 
t 
i=  l,...,  -. 
24m 
Define  the  sequence  pi  ,..., ph  by  pi  =  akL, where 
k,  =inf{r3  1 ( 3pjE  [a,,  arpl]}, 
and  pi  =  ak,, where DYNAMIC  MONOPOLY 
if the  inf is over  a nonempty  set and  ki  =  t/2Aen  otherwise.20  e observe  the 
following  points: 
First,  m  6  t/2A,,.  Hence  if the  time  interval  between  offers is A,,,  then  the 
m  offers  pi  ,..., ph  can  be  made  in  t/2  amount  of time. 
Second,  after  an  initial  period  in  which  the  price  pn is charged,  if  the 
monopolist  charges  the  sequence  of  prices  pi,...,  PI,  rather  than  the 
sequence  p1 ,..., pm then  any  consumer  q E  [x  -  ~12, x +  421  that  is  willing 
to  buy  at  some  price  pi is  also  willing  to  buy  at  some  price  p,!,  where j  <  i 
and  p,! >  pi -  2A,,/t.  Hence  the  monopolist  charging  the  sequence  of prices 
pi  ,..., pk  rather  than  p, ,..., pm  does  not  lose  time  and  loses  at  most 
[ph  -  pI]  2A,,lt  on  each  sale. 
Third,  if  R”,  is  the  return  to  the  monopolist  from  the  strategy  that  has 
him  charging  ph, p1 ,..., pm in  the  first  ti  periods  and  playing  optimally 
thereafter,  and  if R;  is  the  return  to  the  monopolist  charging  ph,  pi,...,  p& 
in  the  first  m  periods  and  then  continuing  optimally,  then  since  @A,,  >  I 
and  md,,  <  t/2  we have 
id 
R~-R~>[e-“/2-e~rt]  RE(x+&/2)-2  t  E(Ph  -  PLL 
where  R”(x  +  42)  is  the  monopolist’s  maximal  return  after  state  x +  s/2  in 
the  equilibrium  associated  with  PA,,.  Hence, 
;-q  3  Ceprf/2-,-.t  1C1-e-rd~:“lM-(24,,,/t)~Cph-pll, 
where 
using  the  fact  that 
pAFn>  [l  -eprdsnlf  and  E  <  ?'j. 
Let 
A  =  [,-rr/2-,-rr]&f, 
B = 2[I oh -  prllt. 
Then  A,  B  >  0  and  A  and  B  are  independent  of E and  A,. ; furthermore, 
”  An  obvious  adjustment  is  required  if  t/2A,,  is  not  an  integer. 
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Since  1 -  eCrA~ >  0  and  the  function  g(d)  =  A/[1  -  e-“1  is  bounded  on 
the  interval  (0, A,]  for  sufficiently  small  E >  0,  we  have  R”, -  R”, >  0.  But 
this  contradicts  the  fact  that  the  sequence  of prices  pl,...,  pm were optimal 
for  the  monopolist  after  charging  the  price  p,, in  the  initial  period.  1 
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